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​​​​​​​​​On Guerrilla Warfare   by Mao Tse-Tung

3. Guerrilla Warfare In History
Guerrilla warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors.  Under suitable conditions, it has great possibilities.  The many guerrilla wars in history have their points of difference, their peculiar characteristics, their varying processes and conclusions; and, we must respect and profit by the experience of those whose blood was shed in them.   What a pity it is that the priceless experience gained during the several hundred wars waged by the peasants of China cannot be marshaled today to guide us.  Our only experience in guerrilla hostilities has been that gained from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialists.  But that experience should help the fighting Chinese recognize the necessity for guerrilla warfare and should confirm them in confidence of ultimate victory.

In September 1812, Napoleon, in the course of swallowing all of Europe, invaded Russia at the head of a great army totaling several hundred thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery.   At that time, Russia was weak and her ill-prepared army was not concentrated.   The most important phase of her strategy was the use made of Cossack cavalry and detachments of peasants to carry on guerrilla operations.   After giving up Moscow, the Russians formed nine guerrilla divisions of about five hundred men each.  These, and vast groups of organized peasants, carried on partisan warfare and continually harassed the French Army.   When the French Army was withdrawing, cold and starving, Russian guerrillas blocked the way and, in combination with regular troops, carried out counter attacks on the French rear, pursuing and defeating them.  The army of Napoleon was almost entirely annihilated, and the guerrillas captured many officers, men, cannon, and rifles.  Though the victory was the result of various factors and depended largely on the activities of the regular army the function of the partisan groups was extremely important.  The poorly organized country that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army led by the most famous soldier of Europe and won the war in spite of the fact that her ability to organize guerrilla regimes was not fully developed.   At times, guerrilla groups were hindered in their operations and the supply of equipment and arms was insufficient.  If we use the Russian saying, it was a case of a battle between "the fist and the axe" [Ivanov ].

From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition and intervention of foreign imperialists and the internal disturbances of White Russian groups, were forced to organize themselves in occupied territories and fight a real war.   In Siberia and Alashan, in the rear of the army of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles, there were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy's rear but also frequently prevented his advance.  On one occasion, the guerrillas completely destroyed a retreating White Army that had previously been defeated by regular Red forces.   Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were forced to withdraw regular troops from the front.   'Thus not only was the enemy's manpower impoverished but he found himself unable to cope with the ever-moving guerrilla' [The Nature of Guerrilla Action].

The development of guerrillas at that time had only reached the stage where they were detached groups of several thousand in strength, old, middle-aged, and young.  The old men organized themselves into propaganda groups known as 'silver-haired units'; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle-aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups for the children.  Among the leaders were determined Communists who carried on general political work among the people.   These, although they opposed the doctrine of extreme guerrilla warfare, were quick to oppose those who condemned it.   Experience tells us that 'Orthodox armies are the fundamental and principal power, guerrilla units are secondary to them and assist in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the regular forces [Gusev, Lessons of Civil War.].

Many of the guerrilla regimes in Russia gradually developed until in battle they were able to discharge functions of organized regulars.   The army of the famous General Galen was entirely derived from guerrillas.   During seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians lost their war against Italy.   The cause of defeat — aside from the most important political reasons that there were dissenting  political groups, no strong government party, and unstable policy —was the failure to adopt a positive policy of mobile warfare.

There was never a combination of the war of movement with large-scale guerrilla operations.  Ultimately, the Abyssinians adopted a purely passive defense, with the result that they were unable to defeat the Italians.   In addition to this, the fact that Abyssinia is a relatively small and sparsely populated country was contributory.   Even in spite of the fact that the Abyssinian Army and its equipment were not modern, she was able to withstand a mechanized Italian force of 400,000 for seven months.   During that period, there were several occasions when a war of movement was combined with large-scale guerrilla operations to strike the Italians heavy blows.   Moreover, several cities were retaken and casualties totaling 140,000 were inflicted.   Had this policy been steadfastly continued, it would have been difficult to have named the ultimate winner.   At the present time, guerrilla activities continue in Abyssinia, and if the internal political questions can be solved, an extension of such activities is probable.

In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought the English; again from 1850 to 1864, during the Taiping War, and for a third time in 1899 in the Boxer Uprising, guerrilla tactics were employed to a remarkable degree. Particularly was this so during the Taiping War, when guerrilla operations were most extensive and the Ch'ing troops were often completely exhausted and forced to flee for their lives.

In these wars, there were no guiding principles of guerrilla action.   Perhaps these guerrilla hostilities were not carried out in conjunction with regular operations, or perhaps there was a lack of co-ordination.   But, the fact that victory was not gained was not because of any lack in guerrilla activity but rather because of the interference of politics in military affairs.   Experience shows that if precedence is not given to the question of conquering the enemy in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory.

From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red Army fought almost continually and employed guerrilla tactics contently.  At the very beginning, a positive policy was adopted.  Many bases were established, and from guerrilla bands, the Reds were able to develop into regular armies.  As these armies fought, new guerrilla regimes were developed over a wide area.  These regimes coordinated their efforts with those of the regular forces.  This policy accounted for the many victories gained by the guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents.  The leaders of that period properly combined guerrilla operations with a war of movement both strategically and tactically.  They depended primarily upon alertness.  They stressed the correct basis for both political affairs and military operations.  They developed their guerrilla bands into trained units.  They then determined upon a ten year period of resistance during which time they overcame innumerable difficulties and have only lately reached their goal of direct participation in the anti- Japanese war.

There is no doubt that the internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact, and that the experience gained during our internal struggles has proved to be both necessary and advantageous to us in the struggle against Japanese imperialism.   There are many valuable lessons we can learn from the experience of those years.   Principle among them is the fact that guerrilla success largely depend upon powerful political leaders who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification.   Such leaders must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy.

After 18 September 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three north-east provinces.   Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the cruelties and deceits practiced by the Japanese at the expense of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven years.   The struggle can be divided into two periods.  During the first, which extended from 18 September 1931 to January 1933, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity exploded constantly in all three provinces.   Ma Chan Shan and Su Ping Wei established an anti-Japanese regime in Hei lung kiang.    In Chi Lin. the National Salvation Army and the Self-Defense Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Li Tu respectively.   In Feng T'ien, Chu Lu and others commanded guerrilla units.   The influence of these forces was great.  They harassed the Japanese unceasingly; but, because there was an indefinite political goal, improper leadership, failure to coordinate military command and operations to work with the people, and, finally, failure to delegate proper political functions to the army, the whole organization was feeble, and its strength was not unified.   As a direct result of these conditions, the campaigns failed and the troops were finally defeated by our enemy.

During the second period, which has extended from January 1933 to the present time, the situation has greatly improved.   This has come about because great numbers of people who have been oppressed by the enemy have decided to resist him, because of the participation of the Chinese Communists in the anti-Japanese war and because of the fine work of the volunteer units.   The guerrillas have finally educated the people to the meaning of guerrilla warfare, and in the north-east, it has again become an important and powerful influence. Already, seven or eight guerrilla regiments and a number of independent platoons have been formed, and their activities make it necessary for the Japanese to send troops after them month after month.  These units hamper the Japanese and undermine their control in the north-east, while, at the same time they inspire a Nationalist revolution in Korea.  Such activities are not merely of transient and local importance but directly contribute to our ultimate victory.

However, there are still some weak points.   For instance: National defense policy has not been sufficiently developed;  participation of the people is not general;  internal political organization is still in its primary stages, and the force used to attack the Japanese and the puppet governments is not yet sufficient.  But, if present policy is continued tenaciously, all these weaknesses will be overcome.   Experience proves that guerrilla war will develop to even greater proportions and that, in spite of the cruelty of the Japanese and the many methods they have devised to cheat the people, they cannot extinguish guerrilla activities in the three north-eastern provinces.   The guerrilla experiences of China and of other countries that have been outlined prove that in a war of revolutionary nature such hostilities are possible, natural and necessary.   They prove that if the present anti-Japanese war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously.

Historical experience is written in iron and blood. We must point out that the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China in her present anti-Japanese war but will be world-wide.